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Introduction
The economic forces that inﬂuence the value of housing have received much attention
in the literature (among others, see Anderson and Funderburk, 1989, and Greaves, 1984).
Further, the effect that noneconomic factors such as race exert on housing prices has also
been studied. Inspection of this aspect of the literature leaves the student of the capital
markets particularly confused. Straszheim (1974, 1975), Olsen (1974), and Daniels (1975)
all conclude that the value of homes in minority (usually Black) areas is lower than
should otherwise be expected. Lapham (1971), Schnare (1976) and Smith (1981) present
evidence that neighborhood racial composition has no signiﬁcant impact on housing
values. Finally, Kain and Quigley (1970, 1975), Yinger (1978) and Vaughan (1975)
conclude that home values in Black areas are higher than in similar White areas. With
conclusions that differ in magnitude and sign, the issue of the impact of race on housing
prices is obviously still open.
At the center of the debate on racially induced price differentials in housing is the issue
of discrimination. Current research divides the sources of discrimination into two
categories: discrimination against individuals which will henceforth be referred to as
discrimination, and discrimination against neighborhoods which is commonly called
redlining. Discrimination from these two sources is related but separable.
Discrimination against individual market participants impacts value one transaction at
a time. For instance, discriminatory behavior on the part of a real estate broker is likely
to be based on the individuals involved in a speciﬁc transaction. That is, due to the
personal nature of the search facilitation process the bias of an individual agent could
affect the outcome of a speciﬁc transaction without having a measurable effect on the
value of other homes in the area. Likewise, it is also possible that bigotry on the part of
one of the principals involved in the transaction could have a similar localized effect.
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Abstract. At the center of the debate on racially induced price differentials in housing is the
issue of discrimination. This research studies the impact that ethnic as well as racial
composition in a neighborhood exerts on value. In an attempt to extend previous efforts,
aggregate data is used to study the effects of discrimination and lending bias on residential
real estate in Houston, Texas. The data do not support allegations of systematic bias in the
mortgage lending process.On the other hand, discrimination against minority neighborhoods will affect the value
of all homes in an area simultaneously. Speciﬁcally, allegations have been put forth that
lenders refuse to lend in minority areas on the same beneﬁcent terms that are available in
non-minority areas. This phenomenon, known as redlining, would reduce the liquidity of
homes in minority areas. Reduced liquidity, of course, would lead to lower prices (for a
more complete discussion of the effect of liquidity on value, see Hasbrouck, 1991, Kluger
and Miller, 1990, and Moore, 1987).
Previous studies employ unit-speciﬁc data; either transaction or appraisal data. This
creates the possibility that the racial distribution of recent transactions or changing
neighborhood demographics could create the appearance of redlining when, in fact, it
does not exist. This is particularly worrisome given the small sample size employed in
much of the existing literature.
For example, suppose redlining does not exist. Given the powerful statistical tech-
niques employed, a study based on transaction data may still give the appearance of
systematic bias (i.e., redlining) where the actual result is caused by individual bias (i.e.,
discrimination). Confounding the results could be a small number of observations
executed by bigoted market participants that involve high deviation transactions. In such
a case, the individual bias present in these transactions might well be interpreted as
redlining.
Recognizing this possibility, this study departs from the standard transactions data
analysis and examines median home value by neighborhood. When combined with
previous studies, this will shed additional light on two issues: (1) are home values affected
by racial bias, and (2) if so, what is the source of this bias.
The outcome of this research would also affect the literature that examines the ﬂow of
mortgage credit directly. Several recent studies show that after economic criteria such as
income, education and home values are accounted for, neighborhood racial composition
does not affect the ﬂow of mortgage credit (e.g., Holmes and Horvitz, 1994; Schill and
Wachter, 1994). However, if value is systematically lower in areas with high minority
concentration, it is possible that correlation between value and minority would have a
confounding effect and make rejection of the null hypothesis more difﬁcult. This would
call into question the results from these studies.
This article advances the literature in four ways. First, an improved analysis of how the
forces of supply and demand affect housing prices is provided. Second, the city selected
for this study, Houston, Texas, provides a unique opportunity to assess the risks involved
in investing in housing due to the wide price swings experienced in recent years. Third,
ethnic (i.e., Hispanic) as well as racial (i.e., Black) minority status is considered. Finally,
the authors expand the existing knowledge base on the effect of racial composition in
housing by employing a methodology designed to examine the effects of both
discrimination and redlining.
The paper will proceed in the following order. The following section discusses the
methodology. The next section provides a description of the data used. This is followed
by the results and conclusions sections.
Methodology
This paper studies the impact of neighborhood racial composition on home values in
Houston. The dependent variable is the median home value in each census tract as
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this study because they are large enough to allow for meaningful summary analysis, yet
small enough to be reasonably uniform economic units. Obviously, this is not a perfect
match between neighborhood and census tracts. But, with an average of approximately
1500 residents per tract, this should be acceptable in most cases. Larger units, such as zip
codes, lack internal consistency. Data availability and reliability problems preclude the
use of smaller units.
When selecting independent variables, the authors have tried to synthesize economic
determinants from the existing literature in order to maintain comparability. This effort
is, of course, limited by data constraints and statistical problems that arise from the use
of cross-sectional demographic data.
In properly functioning capital markets, value is determined solely by the interaction
of supply and demand. For the purposes of this research, race is considered to be
exogenous to the model. Assume the functional forms of the supply and demand
equations are as follows:
qD5f(So, Ph, Mi, R, F, V) (1)
qS5f(So, Ph, R, Me, V) , (2)  
and the equilibrium condition:
qS5qD5q , (3)
where:
qS 5 Quantity supplied,
qD 5 Quantity demanded,
So 5 A matrix describing socioeconomic characteristics,
Ph 5 A matrix describing physical characteristics,
Me 5 Emigrant mobility (the propensity of residents to move out of an area),
Mi 5 Immigrant mobility (the propensity of residents to move into an area),
R 5 Risk associated with investing in housing,
V 5 Value of homes,
F 5 Financing terms available.
In structural form, the functional equations become:
qD5ß1So1ß2Ph1ß3Mi1ß4R1ß5F1ß6V1eD (4)
qS5d1So1d2Ph1d3Me1d4R1d5V1eS . (5)
Given the equilibrum equation (3), this can be rearranged as:
ß1So1ß2Ph1ß3Mi1ß4R1ß5F1ß6V1eD
5d1So1d2Ph1d3Me1d4R1d5V1eS . (6)
Solving equation (6) for our variable of interest, V, yields the following reduced-form
equation:
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2[ß3/(ß62d5)]Mi1[d3/(ß62d5)]Me1[(d42ß4)/(d62d5)]R
2[ß5/(ß62d5)]F1[(eS2eD)/(ß62d5)] . (7)
The terms in brackets in equation (7) are strictly functions of the structural coefﬁcients.
As such, they can be relabeled to show that they are merely single-valued coefﬁcients.
This yields the testable reduced-form model:
V5p1So1p2Ph1p3Mi1p4Me1p5R1p6F1t , (8)
where:
t 5 the additive error term
p 5 the single-valued coefﬁcients .
Equation (8) represents the valid economic determinants of value. In order to test for
any effect from racial composition, variables that measure race must be added. The idea
in this approach is to isolate a racial effect, if one indeed exists, from what would
otherwise be found due to the basic socioeconomic structure. It should be noted that due
to the interrelatedness of race with some of the other variables, this is accomplished in a
less than perfect manner. Some empirical ﬁndings on the extent of this problem are
provided below. Thus the ﬁnal model to be tested is:
V5p1So1p2Ph1p3Mi1p4Me1p5R1p6F1p7Race1t , (9)
where Race is a set of variables describing neighborhood racial composition.
Operationally, the factors included in equation (9) must be converted to relevant
proxies. In this study, socioeconomic characteristics are proxied by three variables. These
include the median household income (INCOME), the percentage of residents between
25 and 34 years of age (AGE), and the percentage of adult residents with at least some
post-high school formal education (COLLEGE). INCOME and COLLEGE are expected
to have a positive impact on value. The AGE variable is structured to measure what
percentage of the area residents are young homebuyers. Since younger buyers usually buy
less expensive homes, the expectation is that AGE will be negatively related to value. The
physical characteristics are proxied by the median age of the housing stock (HOUSAGE),
the percent of units that are vacant (VACANT) and the percentage of single-family homes
that are rental units (SFRENT). The a priori effect of HOUSAGE on value cannot be
anticipated. HOUSAGE could have a positive relationship with value because of the
enhanced stability of seasoned neighborhoods, while the increased physical deterioration
present in older neighborhoods may manifest itself with a negative coefﬁcient. SFRENT
and VACANT should have a negative impact because they can be viewed as decreasing
stability.
Financing terms available are considered through the use of two variables. First, the
average loan-to-median-value ratio (LTV) is used to gauge the equity component in
mortgage lending. High values of this ratio can be interpreted as an indication of a high
level of lender conﬁdence in the price stability of the neighborhood and should be
positively related to price. Second, the percentage of households whose mortgage
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household leverage. All else equal, higher leverage may imply that prices in an area have
been bid up and thus a positive sign is expected.
Two related mobility proxies are used. The ﬁrst is the propensity of area residents to
move out of an area, referred to as emigrant mobility. To account for this, the percentage
of current residents who are new to the area is used. Assuming a constant housing stock,
a greater percentage of new residents can be interpreted as evidence of the departure of
previous residents. The variable is calculated as the percentage of 1990 residents who have
lived in the area for less than ﬁve years (Me). The effect of emigration on value is
ambiguous. Emigration to other areas may be viewed as causing increased supply which
would result in an inverse relationship with value. On the other hand, the departure of
residents from minority neighborhoods may signify a transition or ‘‘gentriﬁcation’’ effect
as higher income families push out current residents. The gentriﬁcation effect could also
explain the signiﬁcant positive correlation between the two mobility proxies.
However, since the housing stock is not constant, changing total demand for property
must be considered. The propensity of people to move into an area, or immigrant
mobility (Mi), is proxied by the percentage change in owner-occupants between 1980 and
1990. (Me and Mi are measured over different time periods because of data constraints.)
Net increases in the number of owner-occupants should represent increased demand
which would bid up prices. Therefore, Mi should have a positive sign.
Risk differences also affect value. Two related but separable types of risk need to be
considered. These are default risk and depreciation risk. A measure of default risk must
allow for the possibility of past discrimination in the mortgage lending process. In other
words, if minority groups have been subjected to different credit standards in the past, the
default rate measures will be biased.
To minimize this problem, defaults only on government-insured mortgages
(DEFAULTS) are considered on the premise that the government is less likely to
discriminate in the allocation of mortgage credit. This is accomplished by calculating a
ratio of insured defaults to insured loans. The numerator in the equation is the number of
FHA and VA loan defaults in each census tract. Ideally, the denominator would be the
number of loans outstanding; however, this information is not available by census tract.
The denominator in the default rate variable is the number of insured loans granted
between 1988 and 1990. This is appropriate as long as the distribution of recent activity
is similar to the distribution of total loans outstanding. Increased default rates imply
greater risk and should, therefore, have a negative relationship with value.
The default risk variables also point to the problem of determining causation, an
inherent difﬁculty when doing empirical research using cross-sectional demographic data.
Due to the focus of this study, no direct attempt has been made to determine whether
causality runs from default risk to value or vice versa. This limitation is intended to be
addressed as the subject for subsequent research in this area and, therefore, some caution
is necessary when interpreting the coefﬁcients in this study.
Depreciation risk is proxied by the change in home values between 1980 and 1990
(HVCHANGE). This variable is calculated as the change in the median home value
between 1980 and 1990 divided by the value in 1980. During the 1980s, Houston real
estate experienced dramatic but geographically uneven price swings. This provides a
unique opportunity to assess the risk of falling home prices (which erode the equity of the
owner and the collateral of the lender) in different geographical areas. Higher values of
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Assuming the structural factors that caused such wide disparity in price changes during
the mid-1980s still exist, this can be considered a measure of the current depreciation risk
inherent in a neighborhood. Thus, higher values of HVCHANGE should imply lower
depreciation risk and would therefore be positively related to value.
All of the above are appropriate economic variables that could affect value. In order to
determine the impact of noneconomic factors, racial characteristics must also be
included. Three variables are employed. The ﬁrst is the percentage of the population that
is Black (BLK) and the second, the percentage that is Hispanic (HISP). In addition to a
static view, the change in percentage minority (CHGMINOR) between 1980 and 1990 is
also included. This third variable is used to test whether changing racial composition
affects value. The racial variables are the true variables of interest. If the allegations of
racial bias in the mortgage lending process are true, these variables will have a negative
effect on the dependent variable.
It is possible that, in sufﬁcient numbers, transactions biased by the bigotry of
individuals could reduce the median home value in a neighborhood. If the data analyzed
show median values to be lower in minority neighborhoods after controlling for
economic factors, the conclusion will be that either discrimination or redlining exists. The
methodology employed will not allow us to disentangle the effects of redlining and
discrimination if indeed housing values are lower in minority areas. However, since
redlining would affect the value of all homes in the area, if the data show that median
home values are not affected by neighborhood racial composition, the conclusion is that
the redlining allegations are false.





The variables are summarized in Exhibit 1.
The use of cross-sectional demographic data induces into the regression the possibility
of nonconstant variance. To correct for this problem, the Generalized Least Squares
(GLS) model is selected. Additionally, examination of the variance inﬂation factors
indicates there is a minor problem with multicollinearity (INCOME). See Exhibit 2 for
results. This deviation is considered acceptable given that cross-sectional demographic
data is employed and that the socioeconomic variables were selected for comparability
with the existing literature.
Data
The data come from three sources. In all cases, the data are collected for an individual
census tract in aggregate form (i.e., no transaction data). The data used describe either
the percentage of some variable of interest, the median value of some attribute, or the
absolute number of occurrences of some event within a particular tract. The data is
unique to each tract.
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Exhibit 1
Variables List
VALUE 5 Median home value in 1990 (in $1,000)
BLK 5 Percentage of total population that is Black
HISPANIC 5 Percentage of total population that is Hispanic
CHGMINOR 5 Change in percentage minority between 1980 and 1990
INCOME 5 Median household income in 1990 ($1,000)
AGE 5 Percentage of total population between 25 and 34
COLLEGE 5 Percentage of adult residents with some post-high school formal education
SFRENT 5 Percentage of single-family homes that are renter occupied
HOUSAGE 5 Median age of housing stock in the census tract
VACANT 5 Percentage of single-family homes that are vacant
LTV 5 Loan-to-value ratio
MORTRAT 5 Percentage of owner-occupants with a mortgage ratio greater than .3
Me 5 Percentage of current owner-occupants who moved in between 1985 and 1990
(emigrant mobility)
Mi 5 Percentage change in the number of owner-occupants between 1980 and 1990
(immigrant mobility)
DEFAULTS 5 Natural log of default rate in insured mortgages




















VALUE (the median home value) is the dependent variable. BLK is the percentage of residents that
are Black and HISP is the percentage that are Hispanic. CHGMINOR is the change in percentage
minority between 1980 and 1990. INCOME is the median household income. AGE is the percentage
of adult residents betwen the ages of 25 and 34. COLLEGE is the percentage of adult residents who
have at least one year of formal education after high school. SFRENT is the percentage of single-
family homes that are rental units. HOUSAGE is the median age of the housing units in the tract.
VACANT is the percentage of single-family homes that are vacant. LTV is the ratio of average loan-
to-average value. MORTRAT is the percentage of owner-occupants whose mortgage payment-to-
gross income ratio is greater than 30%. Me, emigrant mobility, is the percentage of area residents
who have moved in since 1985. Mi, immigrant mobility, is the percentage change in the number of
owner-occupants between 1980 and 1990. DEFAULTS is the natural log of the insured defaults-to-
mortgages-granted ratio. HVCHANGE is the change in median home values between 1980 and
1990.There are 525 census tracts in the 1990 census map for the Houston MSA. Of these,
forty-one were eliminated either because they were not on land or because they had fewer
than twenty-ﬁve housing units. One additional tract was omitted because it was an
extreme outlier. Examination of the partial residual plots indicated that this one
observation was very inﬂuential. However, had it been included it would not have
signiﬁcantly changed the interpretation of the racial variables.
The default data come from the Harris County Clerk’s Deed ﬁle. The small number of
foreclosures during the 1960s and 1970s would not provide a meaningful measure of risk
in most metropolitan areas. However, the number of defaults in Houston during the
sample period is large enough to allow for the calculation of meaningful default rates. In
1990, there were 1800 foreclosures distributed over 525 census tracts.
The demographic and socioeconomic data are from the 1980 and 1990 census records.
Data on insured mortgages granted used as the denominator in the default rate
calculation are obtained from the aggregation report of the ﬁlings required by the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
The census data and the HMDA reports are publicly available at Federal Depository
libraries. The default data was obtained from Real-Comp, a private ﬁrm that collects data
for the real estate industry. The data are summarized in Exhibits 3 and 4 which provide
information on distribution and correlations.
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Exhibit 3
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
VALUE 79.775 18.800 506.900
BLK 22.846 .129 99.482
HISP 25.200 .288 95.985 
CHGMINOR 12.088 219.428 55.945
INCOME 35.340 4.999 207.014
AGE 19.100 5.986 45.356
COLLEGE 43.443 5.763 97.804
SFRENT 21.857 .000 79.167
HOUSAGE 24.858 5.279 47.690
VACANT 13.159 2.057 67.535
LTV .877 .000 5.342
MORTRAT 16.312 .000 38.715
Me 28.321 .000 76.926
Mi 8.582 276.144 2132.569
Ln DEFAULT 24.614 29.210 1.386
HVCHANGE 33.758 240.000 378.618
VALUE (the median home value) is the dependent variable. BLK is the percentage of residents that
are Black and HISP is the percentage that are Hispanic. CHGMINOR is the change in percentage
minority between 1980 and 1990. INCOME is the median household income. AGE is the percentage
of adult residents between the ages of 25 and 34. COLLEGE is the percentage of adult residents who
have at least one year of formal education after high school. SFRENT is the percentage of single-
family homes that are rental units. HOUSAGE is the median age of the housing units in the tract.
VACANT is the percentage of single-family homes that are vacant. LTV is the ratio of average loan-
to-average value. MORTRAT is the percentage of owner-occupants whose mortgage payment-to-
gross income ratio is greater than 30%. Me, emigrant moblity, is the percentage of area residents
who have moved in since 1985. Mi, immigrant mobility, is the percentage change in the number of
owner-occupants between 1980 and 1990. DEFAULTS is the natural log of the insured defaults-to-
mortgage-granted ratio. HVCHANGE is the change in median home values between 1980 and 1990.DISCRIMINATION, LENDING PRACTICES, HOUSING VALUES 33
Exhibit 4
Correlation Coefﬁcients




CHGMINOR 2.13551 2.23441 .37644
INCOME .80676 2.34030 2.34034 2.09465
AGE .04477 2.29689 .10201 .32080 2.00646
COLLEGE .70424 2.36445 2.54703 2.11761 .62246 .30652
SFRENT 2.37244 .14245 .40772 2.00092 .38964 .22580 2.40948
HOUSAGE 2.29070 .21425 .38917 2.25670 2.47109 2.33619 2.45825 .34039
VACANT 2.26575 .38761 .22988 .12787 2.41219 .09451 2.38569 .41980
LTV 2.29460 .03924 .18712 2.10382 2.33570 2.06233 2.26705 .19998
MORTRAT 2.08467 .57414 2.09134 2.22710 2.13240 2.26959 2.22942 .06804
Me .39446 2.47933 2.19557 .13633 .50232 .45816 .54064 2.15898
Mi .11049 2.10200 2.15202 2.02827 .22929 .17185 .21808 2.12598
Ln DEFAULT 2.25413 .20233 .10322 .11900 2.04223 .14423 2.27427 .02903
HVCHANGE .69562 2.08018 2.18024 2.20640 .76525 .00239 .35011 2.10722












MORTRAT .25691 .14497 2.02654
Me 2.63547 2.29451 2.20847 2.29887
Mi 2.34253 2.17552 2.08547 2.02856 .44393
Ln DEFAULT .00580 .00446 2.07593 .25017 2.06358 .07952
HVCHANGE 2.11593 2.13090 2.28224 .08281 .25328 .09995 2.04060
VALUE (the median home value) is the dependent variable. BLK is the percentage of residents that
are Black and HISP is the percentage that are Hispanic. CHGMINOR is the change in percentage
minority between 1980 and 1990. INCOME is the median household income. AGE is the percentage
of adult residents between the ages of 25 and 34. COLLEGE is the percentage of adult residents who
have at least one year of formal education after high school. SFRENT is the percentage of single-
family homes that are rental units. HOUSAGE is the median age of the housing units in the tract.
VACANT is the percentage of single-family homes that are vacant. LTV is the ratio of average loan-
to-average value. MORTRAT is the percentage of owner-occupants whose mortgage payment-to-
gross income ratio is greater than 30%. Me, emigrant mobility, is the percentage of area residents
who have moved in since 1985. Mi, immigrant mobility, is the percentage change in the number of
owner-occupants between 1980 and 1990. DEFAULTS is the natural log of the insured defaults-to-
mortgage-granted ratio. HVCHANGE is the change in median home values between 1980 and 1990.Results
Median home values in areas with high minority concentrations are lower than median
values in non-minority areas. As shown in Exhibit 5, areas in which more than 80% of the
population is Black have an average home value of $22,460. Areas where Blacks comprise
less than 20% of the population have a median home value of $117,760. Obviously, there
is a signiﬁcant simple correlation between race and value. The question examined here is
whether the relationship between race and value can be explained in terms of lending
bias.
The equation estimated does a god job of explaining cross-sectional differences in
value as is evidenced by an R2 of .80. The regression results are summarized in Exhibit 6.
The major result of this study is that racial composition does not adversely affect home
values after accounting for economic factors. The coefﬁcients for both BLK and
CHGMINOR are not statistically signiﬁcant. HISP is signiﬁcant, but has a positive sign
as opposed to concerns about lending bias which would induce a negative sign. This
could result from lender outreach programs that are intended to increase lending in
minority areas in response to the Community Reinvestment Act. Smith (1981)
hypothesized that this could also be the result of bigotry towards Hispanics by housing
services providers. If the providers of housing services restrict supply to Hispanics, then
the value of homes in Hispanic areas will be bid up. Still another possible explanation
could be the number of Hispanics employed as live-in domestics in the more afﬂuent
neighborhoods. This appears to be plausible considering that when observations with
VALUE greater than $200,000 are not included (approximately the top 10%), the
coefﬁcient is no longer signiﬁcant. Regardless of the explanation, there is no evidence to
support the allegations of lender bias against minority neighborhoods.
A test of the combined effect of all the racial variables using a standard F-test for a full
and reduced model indicates that, collectively, the three racial variables do have a
statistically signiﬁcant impact (F-statistic53.53). However, omitting the racial variables
decreases the R2 by only .0045, indicating that there is little economic signiﬁcance in the
explanatory power of the racial variables. Additionally, the combined statistical
signiﬁcance is due to the positive HISP coefﬁcient. The data demonstrate that value is
not adversely affected by racial composition after reasonable economic factors are
included.
One anomaly in the results is the effect of vacancy. The expectation is for vacancy to
have a negative impact on value because it represents excess supply. However, the data
indicate that vacancy rates have a direct relationship with home values. Although this
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Exhibit 5
Housing Value in Thousands by Concentration of Minorities
Percentage by Minority





81–100 22.46 30.14could be a statistical anomaly, it could also be explained in economic terms. High
vacancy rates may indicate a propensity on the part of area homeowners to maintain
higher reservation prices. That is, high vacancy rates may be indicative of the ability of
homeowners in an area to forego current income (in the form of rents or low sale price)
for future income. The capacity to forego current income may imply greater wealth. The
positive relationship between value and wealth may explan the positive sign on VACANT.
Value does respond to reasonable economic criteria. Of the physical and
socioeconomic variables other than the vacancy rate, INCOME, AGE, COLLEGE,
SFRENT, and HOUSAGE are signiﬁcant with the hypothesized sign. Higher levels of
income and education can reasonably be expected to be associated with higher values.
However, the negative correlation between INCOME and BLK or COLLEGE and
BLK gives rise to questions of whether the socioeconomic variables are a substitute for
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Exhibit 6
Regression Results
Dependent Variable5Median Home Value















Ln DEFAULT 22.6315** 25.84
HVCHANGE .3519** 5.58
CONSTANT 257.9586** 23.71
*signiﬁcant for alpha [.05 for a two-tailed test; ** signiﬁcant for alpha [.01 for a two-tailed test
VALUE (the median home value) is the dependent variable. BLK is the percentage of residents that
are Black and HISP is the percentage that are Hispanic. CHGMINOR is the change in percentage
minority between 1980 and 1990. INCOME is the median household income. AGE is the percentage
of adult residents between the ages of 25 and 34. COLLEGE is the percentage of adult residents who
have at least one year of formal education after high school. SFRENT is the percentage of single-
family homes that are rental units. HOUSAGE is the median age of the housing units in the tract.
VACANT is the percentage of single-family homes that are vacant. LTV is the ratio of average loan-
to-average value. MORTRAT is the percentage of owner-occupants whose mortgage payment-to-
gross income ratio is greater than 30%. Me, emigrant mobility, is the percentage of area residents
who have moved in since 1985. Mi, immigrant mobility, is the percentage change in the number of
owner-occupants between 1980 and 1990. DEFAULTS is the natural log of the insured defaults-to-
mortgages-granted ratio. HVCHANGE is the change in median home values between 1980 and
1990.race. To test this, a regression equation with BLK as the dependent variable and all the
economic characteristics as independent variables was estimated yielding an R2 of .58.
This indicates that, taken together, the economic variables in the model do not serve as a
proxy for race. Income and education data proxy for reasonable economic characteristics
such as neighborhood stability and desirability for which direct data is not available.
MORTRAT is signiﬁcant and positive. All else constant, higher household leverage is
directly related to higher home values. This may also imply higher lender conﬁdence in an
area. Making loans with higher mortgage ratios may be indicative of a greater willingness
to lend in a particular area. This increase in liquidity could possibly be manifested in an
increase in demand and a corresponding increase in home values.
Risk also impacts value. Less depreciation risk (as evidenced by higher values of
HVCHANGE) has the expected positive impact on value. Likewise, high default rates
imply neighborhood instability and therefore have a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect
on value. Investment in housing is not immune from the risk/return parameters of other
investments.
It is interesting to note that if the risk variables are omitted from the model, the Black
variable does become negative and signiﬁcant. Risk must be included in any analysis of
value.
Conclusions
Bias on the part of lenders would have far-reaching effects. If these allegations are
correct, the ﬂow of credit into minority areas would be restricted causing home values to
fall. This paper examines whether neighborhood racial composition affects home values
after economic determinants are considered. For Houston, the data clearly demonstrates
that it does not.
The reduced liquidity caused by lender bias against minority neighborhoods would
cause a decrease in value for all properties simultaneously. On the other hand,
discrimination against individuals would affect value one property at a time. If this
individual bias had a uniformly negative effect in sufﬁcient numbers, it could certainly
lower median value as well.
If the results of this analysis had shown that home values were lower in minority areas
than could reasonably be explained by economic factors, the methodology employed
would not have allowed distinction between discrimination and redlining. However, the
data show that median value is not affected by racial composition. Hence, it can be
concluded that there is no systematic lender bias against minority neighborhoods that is
negatively affecting home values.
The reader is cautioned against extending these ﬁndings to discrimination on an
individual basis. The methodology used certainly does not provide grounds for such an
extension. Additionally, the unique nature of the Houston market during the study
period makes generalization of these results to other areas difﬁcult. More empirical
evidence from other areas is required before generalized conclusions can be formed. This
is left for future research.
Value is sensitive to reasonable economic criteria. Increased desirability increases value
while increased risk reduces value. Standard risk and return parameters determine value
whether the asset involved is ﬁnancial or real.
If the ﬂow of mortgage credit were restricted based on noneconomic factors, it would
36 THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1, 1996constitute a violation of even the weakest economic man argument. This paper has
examined the potential effects of this alleged redlining by analyzing property values by
neighborhood. The data do not support allegations of redlining.
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